Abstract. Both Brentano a n d Merleau-Ponty have developed a n account o f intentionality, which nevertheless differ profoundly in the following respect. According to Brentano, intentionality mainly is a matter of mental presentations. This marks the beginning of phenomenology's difficult relation with the nature of the intentional reference. MerleauPonty, on the other hand, has situated intentionality on the level of the body, a turn which has important implications for the nature of intentionality. Intentionality no longer is primarily based on having (re)presentations, but is rooted in the dynamics o f t h e living body. T o contrast those approaches enables u s t o make clear i n what w a y intentionality i s studied nowadays.
INTRODUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF INTENTIONALITY
Both Brentano a n d Merleau-Ponty have developed a n account o f intentionality. Although they both stand i n t h e phenomenological tradition, their views differ profoundly in the following respect. According to Brentano, intentionality mainly i s a matter o f mental presentations. This marks t h e beginning o f phenomenology's difficult relation with the nature of the intentional reference. Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, has situated intentionality on the level of the body, a turn which has important implications for the nature of intentionality. Intentionality no longer is primarily based o n having (re)presentations, b u t i s rooted i n t h e dynamics o f t h e living body a n d i s inherently anticipatory.
To contrast these approaches 2 enables us to make clear in what way intentionality is studied nowadays. On the one hand, classical cognitive science h a s a Brentano-like conception o f intentionality, which entails internalism with regard t o intentionality. O n t h e other hand, more recent approaches i n t h e study o f cognition take a critical stand against the classical approach and focus, in their account of intentionality, on embodiment, situatedness and interaction.
First, a n outline o f Brentano's account o f intentionality i s given, t o point o u t that h i s account encounters some serious problems. Moreover, these problems are, in important respects, similar to (notorious) problems classical cognitive science faces.
Secondly, w e will turn t o t h e early work o f Merleau-Ponty i n order t o give a n alternative approach t o intentionality. This will be compared to more recent approaches, especially with regard to their radical criticism on representation a n d their stress o n embodiment, situatedness a n d interaction a s a n alternative. In so updating phenomenological insights, we pursue a coherent frame in which the main shortcomings and possibilities of classical and recent models of intentionality can be accounted for. Brentano does not make a distinction between two senses of "object", the immanent object and the external object or referent. For him, an object is a mental content. Consequently, he only focuses on the Vorstellungen (ideas), which have, a s f o r Descartes a n d t h e British empiricists, a central role t o play: they a r e t h e basis o f a n y mental activity.
FRANZ BRENTANO'S ACCOUNT O F INTENTIONALITY
Although Brentano does not deny that physiology and genetic psychology (which is mainly physiological in character)
a r e important disciplines, h e wants t o delimit t h e field o f h i s 'descriptive' psychology t o t h e realm o f t h e mental. Therefore, t h e mental a n d t h e physical a r e regarded a s distinct phenomena, a n d psychology i s exclusively the science of mental phenomena.
Physical phenomena a r e t h e object o f external perception, a n d they a r e mere phenomena, which means that w e have no right to believe that they exist in the same way as they appear to us. 7 Although his remark is somewhat surprising, Brentano's conception surely is easily reconcilable with Kraus' (interpretative) remark. We will return to this.
Every mental phenomenon is not only directed to a primary object (i.e. a physical object, for example a sound), but also to itself (the act of hearing a sound). A mental phenomenon thus takes itself as secondary object, which provides the inner experience of our mental act. We do not only hear a sound, but also experience that we hear a sound. For short, there not only is a Vorstellung of the sound, but also a Vorstellung of the Vorstellung of the sound. Moreover, every mental a c t i s accompanied b y a judgement, t h e inner perception, which i s a n immediate a n d evident cognition of the act. There also is a third kind of consciousness related to it, a feeling which refers to the act, such a s pleasure o r displeasure. I n summary: "Every mental a c t i s conscious; i t includes within i t a consciousness o f itself. Therefore, every mental act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary object the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. Consciousness of this secondary object is threefold: it involves a presentation o f i t , a cognition o f i t a n d a feeling toward it." 9 B u t also t h e primary object c a n b e present i n consciousness in a threefold way. 13 Brentano's theory of evidence is entailed by his view on the intentional object, which does not resemble reality, but merely is a "sign" that there is something in the outside world that eventually causes t h e intentional object. 14 15 That t h e English translators chose 'presentation' a n d n o t 'representation' for the German 'Vorstellung' relates to the fact that Brentano does not endorse a correspondence theory of truth.
Consequently, truth is primarily a matter of judgement and the predicate 'true' has to refer to the act of judging, not to what is judged. The immanence of consciousness cannot be solved: a mental act refers to an inner content of consciousness; the relation to the outside is not present. Therefore, Brentano's view can be considered as internalist: there is no way out of the immanence of consciousness.
BRENTANO A N D CLASSICAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE
Classical cognitive science considers representation as a basic concept. Cognition is explained by means of theories i n which representation h a s a central role t o play. Representations guarantee meaning a n d t h e intentional relation.
I n general, representations re-present (part o f ) t h e external world a n d a r e based o n sensations. Representation i s , a s t h e Vorstellung i n Brentano's account, t h e basic unit i n t h e explanation o f cognition a n d provides a means for answering questions about how systems can have knowledge about the world and act in it. Nevertheless, the focus is almost exclusively on what happens inside the mental apparatus, which leads to a form of internalism, both i n Brentano a n d classical cognitive science.
I n Brentano's case, t h e reference relation i s situated between a mental a c t a n d a Vorstellung, a n d this idea o r presentation is to be situated inside the realm of the mental. The object of consciousness, the presentation, is something within the structure of consciousness. The mental subject refers to its Vorstellung and the intentional relation does not transgress the border of the mental.
In classical cognitive psychology, t h e stress i s o n internal mental operations, a n d t h e concrete environmental circumstances of the mental system is hardly or only in a very abstracted way taken into account. The external environment is represented in the system, in the form of an isomorphic representation, and/or as a representation based o n perceptual input i n order t o update t h e model o f t h e environment. There i s a n intermediary between system and environment, and the system thinks and acts on the basis of this intermediary. As in Brentano, this intermediary should b e conceived a s t h e actual term t o which t h e intentional relation refers.
T h e fact that t h e system receives sensory input is as less significant as it is in the case of Brentano. To make up for the lack of relation between the Brentano-like content and the external world by adding a sensory cause for the appearance of mental presentations is therefore not very helpful. consciousness is related to the mental contents 16 which are already there. To ask for the origin of mental presentations, will eventually lead him into a problem similar to the problem of classical cognitive science: how does a system acquire a semantic interpretation of the representational mental symbols? How are ideas or representations related to the external in a way meaningful to the system itself? Although the presentations are connected, via sensory processing, t o a n external domain, t h e system h a s n o intrinsic qualities b y which i t c a n acquire a meaningful or semantic access to its own representations.
In this sense, the symbol grounding problem is of course related to the frame-of-reference problem: in order to The frame of classical cognitive science has a number of presuppositions that prevent a solution for such problems and lead to a conception of intentionality similar to the one of Brentano. First, they assume the existence and usefulness of representations. Second, representations mainly are to be interpreted as formal-linguistic (syntactic) entities. 18 Third, t h e need f o r a n external observer i n t h e symbol grounding problem points t o a very narrow conception of 'agency'. The agent is profoundly disembodied, the only important processing is situated in the mental, and any bodily implementation is just a technical device for exerting the output of computational processing o n symbols o r representations. F o r short, t h e narrow conception o f agency i s related t o t h e fact that those systems a r e n o t situated, disembodied a n d n o t truly interactive.
T o take representations a s t h e basis f o r intentionality leads, i n t h e case o f Brentano, t o a form o f internalism a n d in t h e case o f classical cognitive science t o t h e symbol grounding problem, t h e frame o f reference problem, t h e frame problem a n d t h e 'instruction' problem. Internalism i s t h e attempt t o model a system entirely i n terms o f internal entities a n d relations that a r e characterisable separately from system-environment interaction, capacities a n d processes, a n d t o characterise i t s nature a s constituted intrinsically o f distinctive internal operations.
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A n alternative solution may provide a way to escape these problems. We can find an alternative in the early work of MerleauPonty, who stands in the same phenomenological tradition, which Brentano inaugurated.
MERLEAU-PONTY ON INTENTIONALITY
The main change Merleau-Ponty has made regarding the concept of intentionality, is to situate intentionality on t h e level o f t h e living body, a n subject a n original w a y o f referring t o a n object, (...)" 21 According t o Merleau-Ponty, consciousness i s originally n o t a 'cogito' but an 'I can'. Locomotion is the original and initial form of intentionality, and not the 'servant of consciousness'. Merleau-Ponty criticises classical philosophy, i n which t o acquire a n e w skill i s a matter o f mental activity, o f 'intellectual synthesis'. H e does n o t deny that t o acquire a n e w skill i s t o grasp a n e w meaning, b u t this meaning is a motor meaning, a grasping of meaning through the body. In short, intentionality originates in a bodily and meaningful relation t o t h e environment, without there being representations involved. How comes that Merleau-Ponty's characterisation of intentionality is so different from Brentano's account? To answer this, one has to look at Merleau-Ponty's framework, which differs profoundly from the one of Brentano.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the world is not an objective datum, but must be perceptually acquired. Accordingly, an object is the correlate of my body and is constituted in the grasp the body has on it. An object is not in the first place a mental meaning, but a structure explored by the body. Moreover, sensations have a vital meaning and perceptions are always incorporated in a certain behaviour. From this point of view, Merleau-Ponty criticises the scientific perspective o n behaviour: " I n t h e scientific study o f behaviour, o n e h a s t o reject a s subjective a l l notions o f intention o r utility o r value, because they don't have a basis i n objects a n d a r e n o t intrinsic determinations."
22
I n contrast t o this, Merleau-Ponty says that a n organism i s n o t a passive device, b u t submits external influences t o i t s own descriptive norms. The meaningful relations in the environment actually are the result of the organisation of the organism.
I n this account, t h e relations between a n organism a n d i t s environment a r e n o t a matter o f linear causality, b u t o f circular causality.
T h e environment i s constituted according t o t h e proper nature o f a n organism, a n d t h e reaction o f an organism is dependent on the vital significance of the stimuli, rather than on the material properties. In a certain environment, an organism is always searching for the realisation of equilibrium, which is determined from the inside out. The intentional behaviour of an organism therefore is goal-directed, implicit or explicit. "What we have seen is sufficient in order to make clear that the possession of a representation or the exertion of a judgement, is not coextensive with conscious life. Consciousness rather is a sequence of significant intentions, now clear for themselves, now, in contrast, rather lived than known." 23 I n t h e account o f Merleau-Ponty, cognition o n t h e level o f t h e body i s n o t conceived o f a s a classical kind o f knowledge, but as a 'practognosis'. This means that the body has a world or understands a world without having representations, i.e. without being dependent o n a symbolic o r objectifying function.
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T h e moving body c a n only have a perceptual function s o f a r a s movement itself testifies o f a n original intentionality, i.e. a relation t o a n environment, which is different from classical forms of knowledge. The body is the capacity to do something, and does n o t belong t o t h e order o f a n 'I think' b u t t o that o f t h e 'I can'. According t o Merleau-Ponty there i s a proper intentionality present i n t h e order o f t h e 'I can'; i.e. t h e body knows t h e world a n d t h e organic relation between body and world. Brentano's problem of internalism, entailed by his mentalist view on intentionality, does not appear.
MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COGNITION
Merleau-Ponty's view is not without implications for the study of cognition and intentionality. The interactivist approach t o cognition a n d intentionality explicitly states i t s affinity t o Merleau-Ponty a n d i t s dismissal o f a Brentano-like conception of intentionality. "The focus on systems and interaction translates into an embodied skilloriented approach to intentionality more akin to that of Merleau-Ponty than the abstract, linguistically-oriented T h e emphasis i s o n bodily action a n d interaction, a n d i t i s n o longer assumed, a s i n classical cognitive science, that representation is prior to directed action. Intentional relations are not representational and/or language-like, but are seen in terms of the 'aboutness' of adaptive interaction processes. Concerning anticipation, it is claimed that anticipatory behaviour c a n d o without goal-representing mechanisms. A s behaviour i s conceived o f a s t h e goalachieving activity of an embodied agent and as the system is embedded into a particular environment, embodiment, situatedness a n d interaction play a k e y role i n t h e account o f cognition a n d intentionality. In this account, autonomy -and not representation -is the basic term. Autonomy and intentionality are fundamentally related in the following way. Actions are intentional if they are in service of the satisfaction of constraints. The most fundamental constraint is the maintenance and ongoing generation of the integrity of the system. Autonomy i s t h e capacity t o a c t according t o t h e fundamental constraint o f survival. This implies a normativity, which is non-derivative, i.e. it is determined from the inside out. Merleau-Ponty has already emphasised this feature o f a n organism: organisms that a c t intentionally, a c a r e a n ability t o anticipate t h e interaction process a n d a n ability t o normatively evaluate interaction and use this to modify action."
28 Interaction is used to detect relations, which are important from an affective-evaluative point o f view -t h e organism's point o f view. These relations a r e then used t o reshape t h e interaction i n such a w a y that i t becomes more adaptive. Such organisms a r e able t o learn because o f t h e evaluative feedback (mostly in terms of pleasure and displeasure) from interaction.
The interaction process is modified in such a way that more adaptive effects are anticipated. A hunting cheetah, for example, modifies its hunting technique or targets another prey in cases of unsuccessful action. This entails a view on intelligence, which is different from the classical view. In the classical view, representational symbol processing i s t h e central capacity i n intelligence, while i n t h e more recent view, intelligence i s seen i n terms o f adaptive interaction. Intelligence i s first o f a l l a bodily a n d interactive capacity, a s i n t h e account o f Merleau-Ponty, and accordingly, intentionality i s first o f a l l intentional action.
T h e first concern f o r a living system i s t o act, a n d n o t to represent. According to Christensen and Hooker, it would be a mistake to reify interactive relations as internal semantic content.
T h e n e w cognitive science therefore claims that t h e basic capacity f o r intelligence i s adaptive interaction (i.e. a system i s able t o satisfy t h e constraints i n t h e face o f many varying conditions) rather than representation. Intentional content should be seen as the formation of anticipation by means of which a living system differentiates aspects of its interaction with the environment. Intentionality is to be thought of in terms of interdependence between action, the system and its environment and intentionality as language-like representational reference is rejected.
CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STUDY OF INTENTIONALITY
In more recent approaches to intentionality, the focus is on the constitutive nature of agency, instead of on information processing with i t s emphasis o n internal representations. S o , instead o f opting f o r intentionality a s a Brentano-like relation between a mental act and representations, one opts for interactive effectiveness in the way of Merleau-Ponty. Organisms produce their own meanings, and this is not possible in classical accounts of
